On June 28, 2010, after Acting President Mihai Ghimpu issued a decree, the Moldovan people could officially commemorate, for the first time, the occupation of Bessarabia by the Soviet troops on June 28, 1940. The commemoration of this tragic event in our history should have generated a moment of national unity. Regretfully, it rekindled the political and historical divisions/disagreements that have absorbed the energy of the society, the political class, for over 20 years.

Again before the elections, our brave politicians throw us onto irreconcilable barricades in order to satisfy their own ambitions. In such circumstances, the durability of the decree signed by Mihai Ghimpu without consulting the coalition partners is doubtful. Its fate will be decided by the Constitutional Court, but the dot will be placed by the parliamentary and presidential elections this autumn.

Instead, on June 28, 2011, we might have real chances to commemorate another sad event in our recent history - the end of the Alliance for European Integration (AEI). Many of us consider the AEI was founded after the four component parts undertook a joint set of internal and foreign policy objectives. This thing is only partially true as the joint objectives are only the visible part of the agreement on which every political alliance is based and are mainly formulated with the aim of ensuring public legitimacy. However, the framework and vigor of the political alliances are determined by the tacit part of the political agreements that represent fundamental accords on sensitive and contradictory issues that can destroy any alliance.

The AEI is a similar alliance as it was founded basing on a number of tacit consensuses on delicate problems like the separation of the power, the neutrality, the relations with Russia, Romania, and NATO, the language and history. The observance or at least handling of these consensuses depends on the efficiency of the mechanism for communicating and coordinating the positions inside the Alliance. Unfortunately, this mechanism failed lamentably in the case of the AEI, while Mihai Ghimpu did nothing but reveal this institutional collapse.

As there is no functional consultation and coordination mechanism, the AEI is exposed to risks. The fact that Marian Lupu refused to support the PCRM's proposal to dismiss Mihai Ghimpu from his posts does not mean that the leader of the Democratic Party did it for the sake of the Alliance's unity and survival. This time, he refrained because he is preoccupied with his own political survival. A possible (mis)alliance with the unreformed, arrogant, recalcitrant PCRM that is thirsty for power and blinded by the wish to take revenge would be a risky step in Marian Lupu's political career. Such an adventure would bring him again to the beck and call of Vladimir Voronin who would thus manage to strengthen his position of incontestable and infallible leader of the left in Moldova.

At the same time, we must admit that after the decree to commemorate the Soviet occupation was issued, Marian Lupu found himself in a precarious situation. On the one hand, he does not want to be considered the digger of the AEI's grave. On the other hand, he must cope by himself, without the Alliance's support, with the more heavier attacks on the part of the PCRM and other smaller left parties. Moreover, the Democratic Party risks worsening the relations with the Russian partners if it hesitates to formulate convincing positions as regards a strategic partnership with Russia.

Therefore, we can anticipate that in the immediate future, Marian Lupu and the Democratic Party will be forced to more often adopt separate attitudes different from the AEI's. This is also valid for the other parties as the mentioned decree opened Pandora's box for taking individual steps. If the four leaders hesitate to take measures to close this box, the next months we could witness many deconcentrated and contradictory actions and messages from the four components of the Alliance. Such a development would lead to the antagonizing of the current allies and, ultimately, to the dissolution of the AEI.

Certainly, the AEI is not a holy icon and its disappearance from the political arena is inevitable. Yet, it will be grave if its collapse makes its component parts sworn enemies. At the end of the last century, we had a similar situation and its consequences are still felt. Can the AEI leaders prevent the escalation of controversies inside the coalition? Of course they can, but they should temper first their own ambitions, learn to respect the partners, take their susceptibility into account and go beyond the limits dictated by party interests and the elections. Regretfully, our politicians have not yet learned to build things that would last longer than their temporary positions.

In a recent TV program, the leaders of the AEI expressed their readiness to sign a nonaggression accord in order to protect/save the Alliance. The idea is not bad , but, until the AEI exists, it will seem strange as a government coalition means internal institutional mechanisms that would ensure its unity and existence. Consequently, the Alliance will exist if its leaders find political will to reinvigorate the fundamental agreements on the basis of which the AEI was created. Will they be able to do it? We will see soon.

Victor Chirila, executive director of the Foreign Policy Association, for Info-Prim Neo